Attributive Questions in High Profile Incidents

On 30 January 2026, CERT.PL published findings concerning an electric sector attack on Poland in December 2025. This report, presumably the most complete on the incident covering multiple sources and coming from those directly responding to the total incident, arrived after earlier reporting from commercial organizations on elements of the Read more

What Have We Learned?

Background Almost a year ago as of this writing, the Russian state initiated a new and astoundingly brutal campaign against Ukraine. While Russia had effectively been at war with Ukraine since not long after the Revolution of Dignity, late February 2022 initiated a far wider, nastier, and inhumane phase of Read more

Industroyer2 in Perspective

Background On 12 April 2022, the Ukrainian CERT and ESET disclosed the existence of Industroyer2, a successor to the malware targeting Ukrainian electric distribution and transmission operations in 2016. Industroyer2 arrived after multiple disruptive cyber incidents of varying degrees of success surrounding Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, as presented in Read more

Lights Out in Isfahan

Iranian security company Amnpardaz Soft published an intriguing report on 28 December 2021 concerning a firmware-level rootkit in HP Integrated Lights Out (iLO) products. While frustratingly containing no Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) – not so much for defensive purposes, but for validating research and independently analyzing artifacts – the report Read more

A Spectrum of State Ransomware Responsibility

Questions concerning responsibility for the current epidemic of ransomware events are common, and seek to identify some concrete party to hold accountable for incidents. Yet the immediate perpetrators – largely (but not exclusively) criminal gangs operating in Eastern Europe and Russia – either represent too remote an entity for blame, Read more

Terrorism or Information Operation?

On 09 December 2020, details emerged concerning network infrastructure I’d previously identified as suspicious on 07 December: Further research and investigation showed that the domains in question – which were relocated from “.org” to “.us” infrastructure – were hosting “kill lists” comprising politicians, civil servants, and employees of Dominion Voting Read more