Adversary Attribution: It’s ‘Complicated’

Recently Juan Andreas Guerrero-Saade and Silas Cutler presented new research on the cluster of activity encompassing Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame at the Kaspersky Lab-sponsored Security Analyst Summit. (Note for those reading this from US, Canadian, and related government networks: accessing the research link previously will display potentially leaked, non-public information Read more

Strategic Communication and Cyber Attacks

When reporting on cyber-attacks, articles and media frequently (if not exclusively) focus on the damage or immediate result: how many machines were impacted, how much data was compromised, or what (if any) physical consequences emerged from the event. The latter is especially the case with ICS-focused attacks, from Stuxnet to Read more

Speculation and Judgment

Recently I engaged in conversation with Dale Peterson dealing with the gas explosion events in Massachusetts. For background, following the event in question there were multiple unfounded claims of a “cyber” cause behind these events followed by significant pushback from various ICS security experts. Where Dale and I enter the Read more

Semi-Controlled Chaos

Black Hat/DEF CON week is upon us again. While many poke fun at RSAC (an issue I addressed earlier this year), the annual “Hacker Summer Camp” in Las Vegas is rapidly approaching (or eclipsing) the size of RSA while also becoming more “commercial” and “marketing-oriented” with each passing year. While Read more

Making the Case and Its Implications

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) released a powerful – and incredibly detailed – indictment of 12 named individuals working for the Russian GRU. While many will see this as similar to the indictment of several Chinese nationals for spying in 2014, the cases seem far different in my Read more

The Impermanence of Things and Attribution

I had the pleasure to engage some really smart people on the subject of threat attribution and naming conventions via Twitter recently. I think the linked thread is useful as an example not only of some of the issues the cyber security community still has around terminology and definitions, but Read more

Perception is Reality

Nate Beach-Westmoreland wrote a Tweet recently that piqued my interest, as it aligned very closely to one of my major concerns in a former IR position: how does one ensure that sensitive data isn’t manipulated? Typically, cyber defense focuses on two key impacts: the loss or theft of sensitive (or Read more