On 24 November 2019, WikiLeaks posted an email, purportedly from a whistleblower on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) team assigned to investigate the chemical weapons attack on the Syrian city of Douma. I will let readers find the original WikiLeaks post, but the story was promptly taken up by Icelandic news site Stundin, Italian newspaper la Repubblica, (allegedly) German magazine Der Spiegel (unable to actually find the published story), and UK news source Daily Mail. With the exception of Spiegel, none of these are typically regarded as “top flight” investigative journalism sources, but they aren’t blogs or The Intercept, either. The story essentially alleges that a member of the OPCW team investigating the Douma attack sent an email to their superiors on 22 June 2018, alleging that a “redacted version” of the team’s report selectively omitted or removed details that resulted in materially different representations than what the team intended or discovered.
On its face, this appears damning evidence of a potential cover up or “massaging” of investigative work with the intention of painting the Syrian regime in the worst-possible light. That the attack on Douma on 07 April 2018 was shortly followed by military strikes from the United States with British and French support on 13 April 2018 before the full OPCW investigative team arrived (let alone initiated its investigation) on 15 April 2019 would hint at some pressure to “get the analysis ‘correct’” – if only to justify the strike after the fact. Yet while potentially explosive, an examination of the leaked criticisms – and when they took place relative to the OPCW’s work – shows a different situation entirely.
As pointed out in very thorough detail by researchers at Bellingcat, no “redacted report” even existed given the relevant timelines – an interim report was published on 06 July 2018 (a month after the email), and the full, complete report on 01 March 2019. The supposed whistleblower complaint comes prior to the release of the interim report, and well in advance of the final report. Based on textual analysis of the documents in question relative to the email, all concerns raised by the whistleblower appear to be answered or included in the OPCW’s final report, as laid out in typical methodical fashion by Bellingcat. Ultimately, the analysis team concludes with the following about this story:
Essentially, Bellingcat (correctly) chastises these publications for chasing a potentially “sexy” story but failing to actually read the relevant source documents first. Thus, it appears the “cover up” results in something far less interesting or provocative: criticism of an unreleased draft report by the OPCW that resulted in material changes and adjustments to produce a thorough final report nearly a year later. Given how simply reading the documents in question combined with a basic sense of timing undercuts any supposed “scandal” in this event, why would these news organizations or other parties even pursue this tale in the first place?
We must first begin with some additional context on the OPCW’s work in Syria, and the geopolitical situation in Syria itself. Since the (now almost entirely failed) Syrian revolution (leading to the Syrian civil war) began, Russia has looked to the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad as its regional client worth support and protection. This has escalated from indirect diplomatic support to direct military intervention. Throughout the conflict, Russia has worked to provide diplomatic and related “cover” to Syria through various accusations of chemical weapons use during the civil war. Thus, it was hardly surprising that this story on the Douma investigation was quickly taken up and amplified by RT.
But there’s more to this story than mere favorable news coverage and diplomatic assistance (or outright obstruction). Russian-linked entities have actively worked to infiltrate and spy on the OPCW and the Swiss-based Spiez Laboratory, performing the technical analysis of chemical weapons data (for both the Douma incident and the Skripal poisoning event). In both instances, Dutch authorities identified hacking attempts via spear phishing to gain access to Spiez, and even more brazen close-access operations to spy on the OPCW itself.
While Russian-linked entities have previously engaged in brazen activity against international bodies (such as the International Olympic Committee and World Anti-Doping Agency), the ongoing saga involving OPCW is slightly different. First, while Russian interests are involved (the Syrian regime), Russia is not directly implicated in the Douma event, which would appear to make this a lower priority issue. Second, other campaigns (when successful) leveraged direct release through cut-outs (such as the “Fancy Bears Hack Team” for Olympic messages). One could argue that, in the current situation, Russia merely benefits from WikiLeaks’ activities and is not the actual instigator.
Yet on this, we must take a step back to appreciate the ever-growing links between Russian state interests and messaging and WikiLeaks. The most spectacular and famous example of Russia-WikiLeaks joint activity is the release of collected material from the Democratic National Committee and related entities prior to the US 2016 election. While many conspiracy theorists may continue to doubt the nature of the event, the damningly detailed indictment from 2018 following existing reporting should lay any doubts to rest. Yet this is but one item in what appears to be a deepening relationship, with Russian-directed entities using WikiLeaks to publish information, while WikiLeaks leverages these sources to maintain relevance and mindshare.
That Julian Assange has no love for the United States or much of the greater “West” is hardly surprising given his activity even while hiding from an investigation for rape from his time in Sweden. Yet there are a number of interesting cases where WikiLeaks has benefited from or actively assisted Russian-directed (or at least Russia-benefiting) actions. While there have been some instances of WikiLeaks divulging information related to the Russian regime, these have often been limited and largely rehashes of existing information – nothing remotely close to leaks such as the Panama Papers (which included strong indications of high-level Russian state corruption).
Given this context – from Russian interests in Syria, Russian intervention in Syrian chemical weapons investigations, and the deepening ties between Russian interests and WikiLeaks – the OPCW leak likely represents an effort by Russian-directed interests to harm investigations into its client state in the Middle East. That the allegation itself is largely meaningless (given the timing and analysis in light of reports subsequently released by the OPCW) may indicate an increasing desperation on the part of Russian interests to undermine the organization after failing to break in through multiple attempts as described above. Identifying this email and then utilizing a theoretically neutral third-party (WikiLeaks) to distribute it, including some (limited) press coverage, may be the best Russian entities have at this point after past failures.
Overall, this example – mercifully under-reported in major media outlets given the flimsy nature of the allegations, but trending robustly in social media via tags such as “#Douma” – indicates continued Russian-linked efforts to weaponize information (and misinformation). More importantly still, that this campaign appears to have largely fizzled out may be beside the point, as instead the goal may be to sow distrust, uncertainty, and continuing lack of confidence in institutions and traditional media (similar to MH17 misinformation campaigns). Thus, we remain in a very active information battlefield, with states attempting to leverage all available mechanisms – from spies on foot near international organizations to easily debunked (but still viral) leaks on vetted subjects – to increase discord and undermine official and data-supported narratives. As we move into 2020 with its significant and hotly-contested US election, we should not doubt for a second that information operations and influence campaigns are a part of our recent past – instead they form a part of our present and foreseeable future, with no sign of going away any time soon.
