At present, I will assume anyone reading this possesses at least a basic familiarity with who Edward Snowden is and the general conception of his actions. The former CIA employee (removed from overseas duty for suspicious behavior in 2009) and former Dell and Booz Allen Hamilton contractor for the NSA in Hawaii is infamous for leaking over 200,000 classified documents (and purloining potentially as many as 1.7 million) before first fleeing to Hong Kong then gaining asylum in Russia. The subsequent evaluation of Snowden’s actions has been polarizing to say the least: lauded as a hero for freedom by some, reviled as a traitor by others. Of these extremes, I am far more sympathetic to the latter than the former, but feel this gives Snowden far too much credit while buying in to a persistent pattern of activity, inflating his importance and capabilities, displayed by him since his brief period in US Army training.
Essentially, Snowden has persistently fluffed, obscured, or otherwise exaggerated his experiences and abilities in a long-term career of opportunism stretching to the present. Whatever goodwill he may have initially engendered through some initial leaks that may align with whistleblower activity were destroyed when he escalated his campaign beyond a crusade against domestic surveillance to sustained, expansive activity to embarrass and undermine the US government. His efforts have since been parlayed into international fame and accolades among a not insignificant proportion of the global population, and an upcoming payout with the release of his memoir, from which “The US government could seize royalties… but the substantial advance has already been banked.” Quite simply, the man is an opportunist and con-artist with an inflated sense of self-worth whose actions extend well-beyond privacy-oriented whistleblowing to egregious disclosure of foreign intelligence operations well within the boundaries of international norms.
First, the nature of Snowden’s disclosures. Initial reporting focused on deeply concerning matters given the mission and legal authorities of the NSA: massive ingest of US telephone records and then disclosure of the even-wider ranging PRISM program. Such disclosures highlighted incredibly worrying abuse of post-9/11 relaxation in FISA procedures and concerning legal gymnastics to work around restrictions put in place concerning US intelligence community (IC) activities targeting US citizens through the Church Committee and other efforts. At this stage, while the manner in which the disclosures took place (in Hong Kong after fleeing the US) was curious, the activity revealed was definitely concerning and against legal and operational norms governing the IC in general and the NSA in particular.
But the leaks did not stop. Instead, Snowden lied to and took advantage of his coworkers to enable widespread abuse of his position as an administrator for SharePoint data sharing services to indiscriminately harvest potentially over a million classified records extending far beyond NSA and IC programs even remotely tied to domestic surveillance and privacy issues. Moving well beyond such matters, Snowden blithely revealed and produced documentation related to US espionage activity in China and intelligence activities in Germany. From the perspective of Chinese and German parties, such actions would understandably be unsettling (if not offensive in the case of Germany), but at the same time represent the fundamentals of foreign intelligence collection activity. Thus any outrage seems both unrealistic and outright silly with respect to the conduct of international relations.
We may hope to channel former US Secretary of State Henry Stimson who proclaimed “Gentlemen do not read each others’ mail” as he shut the US Cipher Bureau in 1929, but the myopia (and possible incompetence) behind such a statement should give us pause. The simple fact of the matter is that nearly every country spies on every other country of relative significance. Observers may be shocked to learn that the US spies on allies such as France or Germany – but such countries do not hesitate to use nearly-identical methods for their own purposes. The case of Israel (nominal US ally) extensively spying on the US is exceptional only for the scope and braziness of operations, from Jonathan Pollard to recent deployment of intercept devices in Washington DC. We can certainly condemn such activity – and readers will notice I no longer work for either the US military or the IC, for multiple reasons – but to act as though such activity can stop or not exist demonstrates the worst sort of naivety.
Thus, Snowden’s actions went well beyond whistleblowing on potentially illegal US government activity against its own citizens to reveal (and embarrass) US intelligence operations that align with traditional conceptions and understandings of espionage activity. The value here thus moves well beyond self-proclaimed status as a “a patriot” to something else entirely. Understanding what might motivate Snowden is therefore an interesting avenue to approach.
Thus our next line of enquiry: just what sort of person is Edward Snowden? Multiple media presentations – from feature films to popular books – are almost hagiographic in nature and tone, relaying stories of a misunderstood computer genius working tirelessly to expose wrong-doing and secure the freedoms of his fellow citizens. Yet the praiseworthy coverage glosses over a number of inconsistencies or outright red-flags in Snowden’s biography:
- Identification with military special forces which, though superficially accurate, obscure inconsistencies in training status and experiences based on discussions with servicemembers familiar with his enlistment type and training program.
- While employed by the CIA, Snowden was removed from overseas position (basically fired) due to troubling behavior and other items rendering him unfit and untrustworthy for service.
- Snowden serially inflated (or outright lied) about his background and education credentials.
- Evidence exists that Snowden may have leveraged his knowledge of and access to NSA networks to steal information concerning an examination for Tailored Access Operations (TAO) – enabling him to pass the exam after failing the first time.
- Snowden abused his position and – more damning in my eyes – the trust of colleagues to collect additional logon information and credentials to further the theft of documents.
At this point, the image of Edward Snowden becomes less that of a noble, persecuted genius and more the portrait of a persistent opportunist and pathological liar. More importantly, Snowden continuously engaged in the sort of puffery and boasting concerning his own abilities and experiences – from his almost non-existent military career to his CIA experience to his “hacking wizardry” as a SharePoint administrator – to identify him as a self-important, attention-seeking narcissist. Sadly, Snowden has had enough enablers and sympathizers since absconding with data from his employer that his popular reputation often seems at worst “misunderstood, sensitive genius”. It is a profound tragedy that so many have been duped by someone with motives so shallow.
Some have looked at Snowden’s behavior (and especially his refuge in Russia) as indicating he is (or at least was) an agent of a foreign power – most likely Russia. Yet while I can understand this view and his activities have certainly benefited such entities enormously, I don’t think this is the case. Rather than being one of the most successful (or damaging, depending on your perspective) intelligence assets in history, or the crusading freedom fighter he portrays himself to be, I instead think the explanation for Snowden’s behavior is more banal and disgusting. Given his history, his reputation, and consistency of action over the near-decade prior to leaving Hawaii for Hong Kong, Snowden is that most pathetic sort of agent: someone merely seeking the attention and adulation of others, no matter how he obtains it. From persistent credential and experience inflation to his wholesale embrace of the mantle of internet freedom fighter, Snowden is simply acting out because it makes him important. Snowden has essentially abused access to sensitive information and the trust of others to obtain information that has allowed him to achieve a sense of importance and fame that he has long desired. This behavior has certainly allowed him to become a very “useful idiot” for multiple parties – from Russia to China to entities hostile to the US to privacy “radicals”. But in the end, there is no big mission, no great motivating zeal, or enduring cause driving Snowden on – all he has at the end of the day is a need to continue living out his act as a con-artist while satisfying his need for the attention of others. That potentially so much harm has been caused by one man’s selfishness and sense of self-importance is astounding and sad.
For the record, if Snowden had stopped with the disclosure of the US domestic surveillance programs, I might still not like the man (given how he went about revealing them), but I probably could have respected him. Such programs are antithetical to the ideals the US (claims to) uphold, and they should have never been brought into existence. But no matter how praiseworthy these initial disclosures may be, all subsequent activity only serves to make this man a traitor – not just to the country he swore multiple times to defend, but to his coworkers, to those who have gone well out of their way to defend his actions and enable his life in exile, and all those who have been duped to think this serial liar is some sort of hero.
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Update, 15 September 2019 1414 MDT:
Some individuals are posting false information concerning whistleblower protections covering the US Intelligence Community, and the NSA (a component of the US Department of Defense) in particular. Specifically, stating that “Intelligence community contractors didn’t have whistleblower protections in 2013 when Snowden leaked.” This is categorically false, as indicated in DOD OIG Instruction 7050.11, which implemented the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (ICWPA) within DOD IC components. As enacted and in force since 2007:
Eligible Originator: Only applies to employees (civilian, military or contractor) assigned to the four DoD intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, NRO, and NGA). Does not apply to activities of the military services, combatant commands, or Office of Secretary of Defense.
The Instruction (and handy webpage) provide for multiple classified and unclassified mechanisms to inform the DOD Inspector General of complaints falling under the ICWPA.
